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DESTABILIZATION IN SOUTHERN AFRICA
On December 9, 1982 helicopters dropped a heavily armed force of one hundred South African commandos into Maseru, Lesotho.
The commando force hit twelve separate sites in and around Maseru, using bazookas, machine guns, grenades, and incendiary
devices to blast through doors, demolish houses, and kill those inside. Most of the forty-two victims of this raid were black South
African refugees. Other victims were Lesotho women and children who happened to be in or near target houses.
The raid on Lesotho is but one of many examples of what Congressman Howard Wolpe has described as a "dangerous development of escalating instability" in southern Africa. As the countries in southern Africa have attained majority rule, Pretoria has
engaged in a systematic and sustained campaign of military and economic destabilization throughout the region . The destruction
of human beings and vital economic installations has been enormous in countries such as Angola, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe.
South Africa's aggression has even extended as far as the far-flung Seychelles.
Despite protests from the target countries and condemnation from the international community, South Africa continues to threaten
its neighbors with economic reprisals and military strikes with impunity. Indeed, although the Reagan administration claims to
be interested in restoring "regional peace and stability," it has done little-if anything-to raise the costs of South African aggression.
This ISSUE BRIEF will discuss these and related issues, beginning with an interview with Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda
conducted by TransAfrica Forum's Executive Director, Randall Robinson. □

How would you describe the South African efforts to
destabilize the adjoining countries?
KAUNDA: Perhaps, the place to begin is my recent
meeting with Prime Minister Botha. We, as Frontline
countries, continue to observe the policy worked out by
African member-states of the OAU in Lusaka, which has
been called the "Lusaka Manifesto on Southern Africa."
We recognize the right of the white people in southern
Africa to live as ordinary human beings. It is not the black
majority that has rejected the white minority. It is the
white minority in control of political power, of economic
power, of social and cultural power, of scientific and
technological power, and of defense and security power
who have rejected the majority.
We can only conclude that by doing what they are do-

Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda

ing the racist South African government wants to push
back the line of genuinely independent states, to create
puppet states which they will be able to control, and
thereby to rob the indigenous peoples of these countries
of the genuine independence which they enjoy today.
Every country in southern Africa today has suffered
in one way or another the destabilization process. Angola
has been attacked several times . Even now as we are
speaking, there are racist troops on Angolan soil.
Botswana has come under attack from time to time, so
they suffer from the same destabilization process . In
Lesotho the same thing occurs: racist puppets attacked
the Lesotho's Prime Minister's home and ran away into
South Africa.
IT IS NOT NELSON MANDELA NOR OLIVER
TAMBO ... WHO ARE GOING TO BRING COMMUNISM TO SOUTH AFRICA. BOTHA AND HIS
SUPPORTERS ARE GOING TO BRING COMMUNISM-WHICH THE U.S. FEARS SO MUCHTO SOUTH AFRICA.

In Mozambique they have orgaruzed thousands of puppets, who they have sent to destabilize the government.
There is a serious attempt to overthrow the government
as they are doing in Angola. In Swaziland a different type
of destabilization continues. In Zambia twice they have
trained terrorists to overthrow our government-a
government elected by the people of Zambia. In Zimbabwe they have taken over Muzorewa's gangsters, and
they are training them now. As you can see, there is not
one country among the Frontline States that has not in
one way or another faced this continuing program of
destabilization by racist South Africa.

How would you describe the difference in South African
behavior before and since the election of the Reagan
administration?
KAUNDA: It is difficult to say whether or not there has
been any difference in approach by the South Africans
to our situation in southern Africa. The only way in which
change could be measured is in relation to certain actions
South Africa might take. They could solve the Namibian
issue by withdrawing from the country and by allowing
the people of Namibia to elect their own government and
to live in peace thereafter. They could also stop this process of destabilization to which I referred earlier. Therefore, I cannot say with a clear conscience that there has
been any change because I have not seen it. Moreover,
I haven't seen anything to make me believe that there will
be some change to come.
Why did you decide to meet with Prime Minister Botha?
KAUNDA: I have said before that if the problem is not
solved quickly it is going to explode very violently. If it
should explode, it is going to make the French Revolution look like a Sunday morning children's picnic. Apart
from the 24 million people in South Africa, it will affect
everyone in southern Africa when it explodes. We are all
in a small canoe sailing on the Zambezi River. We are
moving toward cataracts very soon. If this small canoe
capsizes , we all will perish.
Never before, have we had a situation in which the
"haves" are all of one color and a minority while the
"have nots" are all of one color and a majority . This
very powerful minority is supported by the powerful
forces which we humanists call forces of exploitati ve international capitalism and its off-shoots of imperialism,
colonialism, neo-colonialism, zionism , faci sm, racism ,
and apartheid.
Has American investment in South Africa underpinned
their capacity to destabilize their neighbors?
KAUNDA: Precisely. I am not accusing the U.S. government, or the West German government, or the French
government. Monopoly multinationals are not under the
control of any government; they are powers unto themselves. They have invested in South Africa because they
want to make huge profits. That suits the Boers in South
Africa. They do not want change there at all.
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As has happened in Zimbabwe, in Zambia, in Mozambique, and in Angola, when the people themselves take
power, the distribution of wealth takes on a new
character. Governments of the people, by the people, and
for the people are established. They are going to produce
wealth and to distribute it to fit the needs and requirements of all the people. This is what the Boers do
not want to see. This is not what monopoly capitalists
would like to see happen in South Africa. So the two of
them have come together to exploit the masses of South
Africa's people.
How should the United States government respond to
South African destabilization attempts? What is wrong
with current American policy?
KAUNDA: I know of no government today which clearly has as much influence with the South African government as the U.S. government has. Therefore, the U.S.
has a very grave responsibility with respect to the explosive southern African situation. I am not in a position to lecture your government as to how to go about
bringing majority rule to South Africa; but even in the
selfish interest of the investor, they have to do something
and do something quickly. Time is not with us; time is
running short.
It is not Nelson Mandela nor Oliver Tambo nor other
leaders in South African jails or who are outside South
Africa fighting for their rights who are going to bring
communism to South Africa. Botha and his supporters
are going to bring communism-which the U .S. fears so
much-to South Africa.
Nothing can stop the young people of South Africa
from fighting for their independence. Western capitals
will not offer them weapons to fight against their own
investment in South Africa. The only countries that provide training and weapons are Eastern, socialist countries
whose ideology is Marxism-Leninism.
Western countries cannot have their cake and eat it too.
When South African young people train in use of these
weapons, obviously ideology follows . When we are dealing with the question of communism, we should look not
at the effect but at the course. Those who do not want
communist ideology to envelope South Africa must remove the cause-the cancer that is killing South Africa.
The Russians are not responsible; they have no way
to get into South Africa except via freedom fighters. To
stop the freedom fighters from going to Russia or to
China, one must stop the cause that makes them leave
South Africa and train in the usage of those weapons.
Will change come to South Africa in the next ten or fifteen years?
KAUNDA: I don't give those people more than five
years before an explosion takes place. Oh no! We don' t
have that much time. If South Africa does not change
now, an explosion is inevitable. Watch the next three,
four, or five years. They are very key in that situation.

ANGOLA

Although none of
the countries in southern Africa has escaped
~
w,
Pretoria's destabiliattempts,
zation
Angola has been particularly victimized.
Angolan President
Jose Eduardo dos Santos has estimated that South Africa has subjected his
country to more than $10 billion in "material damage"
since 1975 . Whether this estimate includes such incidents
as the seizing of more than $200 million in arms during
a major South African operation last year, attacks conducted solely by the anti-government National Union for
the Total Independence of Angola (UNIT A), or joint
UNIT A-South Africa attacks is unclear. At any rate, the
extent of the damage has been undeniably tremendous.
South Africa's attacks on Angola have been numerous
and have incorporated at least four types of activities:
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• Attacks on South West Africa People's Organization (SW APO) and African National Congress
(ANC) refugee camps.
• Financial and logistical support for UNIT A in waging its armed insurrection against the Angolan government.
• Sabotage of economic targets such as refineries, oil
pipelines, and bridges.

• Bombing, military invasion, and occupation of important parts of southern Angola.
Pretoria's most recent offensive against Angola began
in June 1982 in the midst of the delicate Namibia negotiations. According to the South African commander in
Namibia, Major General Charles Lloyd, his troops would
remain in Angola until a cease-fire in the Namibian conflict has been declared.
The foray into southern Angola, beginning on June
11th, was the most intense since the South African invasion of the preceding year in which it claimed to have
killed more than one thousand SW APO guerillas. On July 16th, the South African forces attacked two suspected
SW APO bases at Evale and Ionde which were eighty
miles inside Angolan territory only to find them deserted .
On August 10th, Lloyd's troops clashed with SWAPO
guerrillas further to the north at Tecamutete, killing more
than one hundred insurgents according to South African
reports.
It is ironic, of course, that South Africa sees this type
of invasion as a means of forcing the Angolan's hands
with respect to the presence of Cuban troops. If enough
pressure can be applied, they reason, then Angola can
be forced to send the Cuban troops home. On December
8th, the two governments held their first publicly acknowledged discussions since Angolan independence. But
Angolan officials have little reason to trust South Africa.
While the two governments negotiated, South Africa was
preparing for its now infamous invasion of Lesotho.

MOZAMBIQUE

For the past several
years, South Africa
has also been waging
an undeclared war
against neighboring
In
Mozambique.
January 1981 South
forces
African
attacked the suburbs
of Maputo, the Mozambican capital. In August 1982
Ruth First, an outspoken critic of apartheid, was
assassinated by a letter bomb mailed to her office at the
University of Eduardo Mondlane. Several days later,
South African troops landed in southern Mozambique.
In an ominous warning, South African Defense
Minister Magnus Malan has since stated that his country
might find it necessary to initiate a "Lebanese-type invasion" of Mozambique. Indeed, the Mozambican
representative to the United Nations has reported a
massive build-up of South African troops and military
equipment along its border.
As in Angola, Pretoria's principal weapon against
Mozambique has been an anti-government guerrilla
movement, the Mozambique National Resistance (MNR).
Both former Rhodesian intelligence chief Ken Flowers
and former South African spy Gordon Winter claim
credit for their respective governments for the organization of the MNR. In either case, from 1976 until the signCOMO ROS

ing of the Lancaster House Agreement, Rhodesia provided the MNR with arms, bases, and logistics support
along the Mozambican border. When Rhodesia became
Zimbabwe, the MNR's base of operation shifted to South
Africa. The MNR has inflicted substantial damage on the
strategic southern provinces of Mozambique as a means
of discouraging both Zimbabwe and Botswana from exporting their commodities through Maputo. As its military activity has intensified, the MNR repeatedly has destroyed bridges, railroad lines, communal villages, and
priority development projects.
South Africa's involvement in the MNR goes beyond
planning and providing war materials. "Boer" casualties
discovered when MNR bases have been overrun, European advisors and instructors in MNR camps, and training of MNR forces by South African military bases in
the Transvaal are evidence of the extent of South Africa's
involvement. MNR forces are resupplied regularly at
night by South Africa. South African planes flying inside Mozambique provide the MNR with detailed information concerning Mozambican troop movements.
Despite this compelling evidence to the contrary, South
Africa has disavowed all links with the MNR . It maintains that its threats and its military activities against
Mozambique are merely necessary countermeasures in
response to A NC attacks launched from Mozambique
and to Mozambique's decision to deploy sophisticated
weapons along the South African border.

ZIMBABW E

When Rhodesia
became Zimbabwe ,
South Africa lost its
only remaining ally in
southern Africa. Once
• eoau,
that country attained
majority rule, it also
became a principal target of Pretoria's
wrath. At an assembly meeting of the African, Caribbean, and Pacific European Economic Community held
in Harare during February 1982, Zimbabwea n Prime
Minister Robert Mugabe denounced South Africa's
"systematic policy of destabilization" against his government. Mugabe charged that between five and six thousand mercenaries, many of them former members of
Rhodesia's security forces or former supporters of Bishop
Muzorewa, were being trained by the South African
defense forces for infiltration into Zimbabwe. Moreover,
Mugabe implicated Pretoria in an attempt by the Rhodesian Front to overthrow his governmen t when sections
of the white community in Matabelela nd in western Zimbabwe tried to "press the local black population into a
secession movement. "
Between March and September 1982, the South Africa
supported MNR sabotaged the oil pipeline between the
Mozambica n port of Beira and Zimbabwe twice and immobilized the railway for seventeen days . In addition, the
road between Malawi and Zimbabwe suffered six ambushes within the same period .
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In August 1982 Zimbabwe uncovered further evidence
of South Africa's aggression. A clash took place between
South African soldiers and the Zimbabwea n military
forces several miles inside Zimbabwe near the borders of
Mozambiqu e and South Africa. Three white South African soldiers, who formerly had been soldiers in the
Rhodesian military, were killed while black South
Africans fled, leaving behind an array of Soviet bloc
weapons and supplies identified as being from South
Africa and Ireland. The three dead soldiers were not
members of the MNR as had been speculated. According to Zimbabwea n officials, these men had been trained
in sabotage and had been part of South Africa's "preparation for an invasion" of Zimbabwe.
Although General Constand Viljoen, the chief of South
African military forces , initially denied knowledge of this
incident , he later confirmed that the South African troops
had been on an "unauthori zed mission." Several South
African Defense Force members, however, have declared
that they were deployed regularly in raids on neighboring black states, including Zimbabwe, and that this raid
was, therefore, not "unauthori zed." The soldiers' disclosure was not reflectivee of their higher social conscience but rather resulted from their concern for their colleagues' families who would be unable to collect insurance or pension benefits if the official version of the mission were true. The disaffected soldiers also revealed that
a destabilizat ion center exists at Pretoria's defense headquarters whose sole purpose is the weakening of the
region's black states.

SEYCHEL LES
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The Seychelles, a
group of about fiftyeight tiny, impoverished, and largely uninhabited islands, is
••ooue
situated approximately
a thousand miles off
the east coast of Africa. It is, therefore,
an unlikely victim of South African destabilizat ion attempts . Nonetheless , on November 25, 1981 a heavily
armed band of mercenaries attempted to overthrow the
Seychelles governmen t. The target of the attempted coup
was the Socialist regime of President France Albert Rene;
the intent was to reinstate the pro-Wester n former president James Mancham who had been ousted in 1977. The
forty-five South African, British, and American mercenaries, led by "Mad Mike" Hoare, left South Africa in a
luxury bus headed for Swaziland. From there they boarded a Royal Swazi National Airways flight for the Seychelles main island of Mahe to execute the South African plot.
At Pointe Larue Airport the coup attempt was discovered by a customs o fficer who found an assault rifle in
the false bottom of a suitcase. Although the Security
Force quickly closed in the mercenaries, most escaped
after hijacking an Ai r India Boeing 707 . Hoare ordered
ZA NIA
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the Air India pilot to fly to South Africa, but the embarrassed South African governmen t refused landing rights
at Johannesbu rg airport . However, the plane was allowed
to land at Durban Airport where it was surrounded by
police who arrested the mercenaries .
The trials following the coup attempt-b oth in the
Seychelles and in South Africa-rev ealed unquestionable
South African complicity in the coup attempt. During his
trial for hijacking in South Africa, Hoare confessed that
the South African government was aware of the coup and
that the Defense Force had supplied the mercenaries with
weapons. Georg Schroeder, a German ex-mercenary who
now runs an export business in South Africa, disclosed
that he had informed "the authorities " about the coup .
Relatives of two mercenaries reported that the men had
received a message of encouragem ent from Prime Minister Botha himself on the eve of their departure.
Among those tried in the Seychelles was Martin Dolinchek, a "senior officer" of South Africa's national intelligence service. Dolinchek refused legal aid at his trial,
arguing that his governmen t should arrange for his
defense.
The South African governmen t sentenced Hoare and
his fellow mercenaries to sentences ranging from six
months to ten years in prison for hijacking. They were
never tried for attempting to overthrow the governmen t
of the Seychelles.

THE SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COORDINATION CONFERENCE (SADCC)
" . .. We call on governments, international institutions, and
voluntary agencies to give priority to increasing financial
resources to support southern African efforts toward economic
liberation and independent economic development. This we
believe is the route to genuine interdependence and represents
the best hope for a just and cooperative future for the region
as a whole. "
Heads of Government for SADCC Countries
April I, 1980

On April 1, 1980 the Heads of Government of nine
southern African countries met in Lusaka, Zambia and
signed ''Southern Africa: Toward Economic Liberation.''
The countries included: Angola, Botswana, Lesotho,
Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia,
and Zimbabwe. The document served as a statement of
their "commitment to pursue policies aimed at the economic liberation and integrated development of [their]
national economies." The organization they formed at
this meeting, the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), would aim toward reducing their economic dependence on South Africa and
substituting the mutual interdependence of southern
African economies.
In struggling to promote economic development after
attaining majority rule, these countries had learned that
economic liberation from South Africa was as vital as
political liberation from their colonizers. Although they
had achieved some measure of political freedom, their
economies still were conceived and organized as functions
of South Africa. For example, by the end of the Smith
regime, Zimbabwe's economy was, for all practical purposes, an appendage of South Africa's. South Africa was
its leading export market, offering preferential tariff rates
and providing thirty percent of its imports. Nearly one
hundred percent of Zimbabwean exports and imports not
destined to or emanating from South Africa had to pass
through South African ports.
Similarly, tiny Lesotho has few salable resources other
than the labor of its 1.3 million citizens, 141,000 of whom
work in the gold mines and on the farms of the Orange
Free State, an adjacent South African province. Should
Pretoria stop the flow of Lesotho's workers, a diplomat
has warned that, "the government and perhaps the country wouldn't last a week" because forty percent of
Lesotho's GNP is derived from wages earned in South
Africa.
Six SADCC countries (Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi,
Swaziland, Zambia, and Zimbabwe) are land-locked and
must ship their imports and exports through South
African ports. Drought-stricken countries have been
dependent on South Africa for food. Fuel for some countries must be routed by rail through South Africa.
In response to their pervasive and untenable
dependence on South Africa, the nine members of
SADCC have created a regional organization which will
function alongside the development apparatus of each
member state. SADCC's purpose is to decrease South
Africa' s economic power over the countries and to increase their mutual cooperation. It will help members plan
and implement necessary development projects which a

country would be unable-either logistically or financially-to carry out. SADCC countries will integrate their
regional productive capabilities and will make their development decisions in a cooperative manner.
Six functional areas of cooperation have been identified
for special attention by SADCC, including:
• Transportation and communications.
• Agriculture and food security.
• Manpower training.
• Industrial capacity.
• Energy needs.
• A secretariat.
One SADCC member has primary responsibility for coordinating activities for each of these areas. Other areas of
cooperation are: a development fund, health, mining, soil
conservation, and security planning.
At the organizing conference in 1980, SADCC members agreed that strengthening the communication and
transportation links among them must be a priority if all
other forms of regional cooperation are to occur. Nearly $600 million was pledged by foreign donors for transportation projects which include upgrading Mozambican
railroad lines and increasing the port capacities of Beira
and Maputo. Consequently, the SADCC transportation
network has been successful in redirecting international
commerce away from South African ports. Zimbabwe,
for example, exported thirty million tons through Maputo
in 1980 and more than two hundred million tons in 1981,
in addition to 166 million tons through the adjacent port
of Matola.
South Africa considers SADCC to be a significant development worthy of its "special attention." It has, therefore, mounted a campaign of economic reprisals in coordination with its military destabilization of SADCC
member states. South Africa withdrew locomotives and
technicians it had loaned to Zimbabwe during the Smith
government, ended preferential trading, and abruptly
repatriated black Zimbabwean workers. At a meeting of
South African security officials and the MNR in 1980,
it was decided that transportation links between SADCC
countries should be regularly sabotaged as has obviously been the case.
Although the nine leaders of SADCC states jointly condemned South Africa for its policy of destabilization
"aimed at SADCC member states," Pretoria continues
in its campaign against its neighbors . Only the full force
of international pressure applied against that country is
likely to deter South African aggression .
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